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Introduction: Knowledge transfer in fragmented sciences  
 
Galison (2010) describes STS’s emphasis on ‘the locality of practice’ as the result of 
a rich empirical tradition that has given rise to the so-called ‘problem of disunity’ 
(Galison, 1996b) – resolving how knowledge is transmitted between scientific fields 
despite deep linguistic and cultural fragmentation. 1 Two well-known solutions to 
the problem of disunity are Galison’s trading zones and Star and Griesemer’s 
boundary objects (Galison, 1996a, 1997; Star and Griesemer, 1989), both 
characterized by the establishment of common and neutral linguistic spaces that 
coordinate action and distribute epistemic legitimacy between different 
knowledge cultures within highly heterogeneous interdisciplinary contexts 
(Galison, 1996a; Monteiro and Keating, 2009; Wilson and Herndl, 2007). In this 
paper I draw attention to a different understanding of the problem of disunity that 
does not rely on the need for ‘multiple worlds organized ecologically around issues 
of mutual concern and commitment to action’ (Clarke and Star, 2008) as a 
prerequisite for the communication of scientific knowledge. This will be done by 
analyzing the role of trust in allowing communication to occur in different physics 
communication settings. 
The identification of different kinds of trust corresponding to different 
levels of interaction will be carried out in order to define a scale of ‘social distance’ 
in terms of knowledge practices between distinct cultural groups. Additionally, 
Collins and Evans’ (2002, 2007) enculturation model will be introduced to make 
sense of interactions that are not typically thought to involve trust relationships 
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directly. This ‘enculturation model’ hinges on cases of passive ingress of one 
cultural group into another’s domain where the linguistic contact space lies inside 
the boundaries of one of the groups, with the other one then being ‘parasitic’ on it 
and is the stepping stone to evaluating communications settings that depart from 
the ‘common ground’ cooperative settings by Galison and Star and Griesmer.  
This paper will first present interview material to illustrate the mechanisms 
underlying communication of experimental knowledge to theoretical physics 
across varying degrees of ‘social distance’, focusing on the social mechanisms that 
make these exchanges possible. Theoretical physics lends itself to this analysis 
because it is a highly heterogeneous field made up of various highly autonomous 
subcultures, some of which interact more directly than others with experimental 
cultures. ‘Social distance’ will then be related to the types of trust established 
between theoretical physicists and experimental cultures. 
The paper’s empirical material is taken from interviews with over twenty 
theoretical physics researchers at seven European universities and one in Latin 
America; these were part of a doctoral research project concerned with analyzing 
various elements of the practice of theoretical physics. The interviewees were 
chosen in order to cover the widest possible spectrum of theoretical sub-cultures 
of the theoretical physics community and except for one were all tenured full-time 
researchers at prestigious physics institutes or schools. The choice of interviewees 
was based on the author’s close acquaintance with the culture of theoretical 
physics and convenience samplings stemming from his work as a research assistant 
and postdoctoral researcher in theoretical solid-state models of quantum vacuum 
forces for over ten years. The empirical study relied on a qualitative ‘participant 
comprehension’ approach which has been previously been used in canonical 
sociology of physics research (see Collins, 1984). The interviewees’ main research 
topics are outlined in Table 1, divided between high (or pure) theory and theory of 
more ‘applied’ type: 2 
 
High Theory Phenomenology and modelling 
(H1) stochastic quantum mechanics, (H2) 
dark matter and energy, cosmology, 
condensed matter (H3) theoretical optics 
and applied mathematics, (H4) particle 
physics, quark models(H5) 
thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics, (H5) gravitational wave 
theory, (H6) general relativity, (H7) 
quantum computing and information 
theory, (H8) astrophysics, (H9) biophysics, 
(H10) particle astrophysics and 
cosmology, (H11) theoretical optics. 
 
(P1) applied quantum field theory  
and acoustics, (P2) computational 
nanophysics, (P3) computational 
nanophysics, (P4) computational 
quantum chromodynamics (QCD), 
(P5) gravitational wave experiment 
analysis, (P5) optic experiment 
analysis, (P6) quantum 
electrodynamics modelling, (P7) 
Bose-Einstein condensate 
modelling, (P8) computational 
particle physics. 
Table 1: Interviewees main research areas. 
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The social gap between high-theory and experiment 
 
Cultural and linguistic fragmentation through specialization occurs across all of 
science, but physics offers a particularly interesting case because of the very 
distinct division of labour that exists between theory and experiment – markedly 
different from, for example, some of the biological sciences where the division 
between theory and experiment is not seen to be a critical structuring factor of the 
field as a whole. 3 
The mathematically oriented, theoretical subculture that I will focus on in 
the first sections of this paper will be referred to as high-theory. High-theory is the 
kind activity most often thought to comprise ‘theoretical physics’, concentrating 
on posing, manipulating and finding solutions to the equations that govern the 
most basic interactions between physical bodies using highly mathematical 
language (and increasingly, computers). It is sometimes also referred to as ‘pure’ 
theoretical physics in opposition to ‘applied’ theory that deals with concrete 
physical systems. High-theory is often abstract, dealing with hypothetical physical 
universes, physically unrealized scenarios, etc. Some high-theoreticians are only a 
step away from doing applied mathematics, concentrating on problems that are 
only loosely tied to a physical interpretation of the mathematical techniques being 
used. 
How far from an experimental physics culture is high-theory in its daily 
practice? Consider the following reply when a senior high-theoretician was asked 
about the relevance of experiment for his own work: 
 
It is quite clear that nowadays you can do excellent theoretical physics 
without knowing how to even tighten a screw. A good theoretician can 
acquire profound and solid physical intuition while being completely 
detached from experiment. 
 
Yet this same theoretician remarked only moments later: 
 
For theory, experiment is a fundamental guide. Physics is still a science with 
an experimental foundation. One must always be aware of how the 
experimental results were arrived at. One must have a clear idea of the 
limitations of the experiments so that one can appreciate to what degree 
what one is doing is really well founded. Theoretical physicists aren’t always 
aware of these details, but it is one of the main barriers you face in this field. 
 
A simultaneous portrayal of theoretical physics as both fully detached but at the 
same time ‘grounded’ in experiment is often encountered when interviewing high-
theoreticians about the role of experiment in their work.4 This rhetorical stance, 
which considers physical theory as an empirically based science, is common to 
theoretical discourse, even though members of high-theoretical cultures only 
rarely maintain direct contact with experiment. Some high-theoreticians may even 
devote entire portions of their professional lives to making novel and ‘empirically 
testable’ predictions of observable phenomena, yet never work directly with a lab. 
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Thus a senior high-theoretician who has worked on optical phenomena 
throughout his career explained: 
 
Reyes-Galindo: You’ve made quite a few theoretical predictions of 
phenomena. Do you have any direct contact with a laboratory where you 
can say, ‘do this’ or  ‘don’t do this’? 
 
Theoretician: No, no, no. In this conical refraction episode, astonishingly – 
and actually for the first time – I had some contact with an experimental 
group in Dundee. I’ve just recently encountered them. I’m predicting all 
kinds of things, like if you put crystals in series what would you get, and so 
on. That’s something where I’m directly involved, but it’s unusual for me. I 
don’t normally do that. There are different types of theorists, and some 
people work very close with the experimentalists. It’s fun to do that, but I 
tend not to. 
 
Full appropriation of laboratory knowledge can only happen through direct and 
prolonged engagement with an actual laboratory culture; without direct contact 
with an experimental culture high-theoreticians cannot ‘have a clear idea of the 
limitations of the experiments’ or ‘appreciate to what degree what one is doing is 
really well founded’. 5  So while few theoreticians would deny the impact of 
experiment on high-theoretical work, 6  high-theory’s minimal contact with 
experimental cultures indicates that if experiment is a guide for theoretical work it 
cannot be so through a simplistic sort of direct empiricism. 
 
You need a busload of faith to get by 
 
Elaborating on how the appropriation of experimental knowledge comes about in 
his own work, a young theoretician specializing in high-energy physics, superstring 
theory, gravity and other (as he described it) ‘sexy’ high theory subjects explained: 
 
At some point I have to take on faith what experimenters tell me. I know 
that there are important questions that need to be answered like the 
cosmological constant, dark matter, the spectrum of Cosmic Microwave 
Background radiation or fluctuations you can see, problems in fractional 
quantum Hall effect or high temperature superconductivity. I’ve never done 
any of those experiments, and I don’t understand most of the experiments, 
but you know, I have faith in these problems that need answering. 
[emphasis added] 
 
Of course, the idea of faith as a foundational element of physical theory contradicts 
the typical views of physics as a directly empirical science. Yet high-theoreticians 
constantly refer to trust in explaining how experimental knowledge trickles down 
from the lab to the theoretician’s blackboard or simulation – though not without 
some degree of resistance even for a candid interviewee such as the one above. 
When pressed to explain what this ‘faith’ implied, the same theoretician remarked 
that it was not so much a matter of ‘blind faith’ but rather of selecting who to 
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believe, a kind of ‘trust’, since given enough time and resources he was sure that 
the experimental results on which he based his work would end up being verified: 
 
I’d call it trust, but trust based on lots of evidence and trust that I can test it 
at any time. Certainly I don’t understand the way LHC [Large Hadron 
Collider] works. But I could. I could sit down and spend three years of my life 
figuring this out.  [emphasis added]. 
 
How realistic is the possibility of carrying out this fact-checking personally? When 
asked about the possibility that another theoretician might fully understand the 
LHC results he uses in his own work, the theoretician replied that although he 
could not name such a person on the spot, there certainly had to be theoreticians 
at CERN who would be able to understand these experiments: 
 
I know theoreticians who understand it. I’m sure they didn’t put a fuse 
together, but yeah, I know … uh … for example the ones who work at LHC 
full time, they could tell you what all the quirks were, what could be going 
wrong, what to worry about. 
 
But for a high-theoretician to spend three years of his or her life understanding the 
intricacies of an LHC-like experiment would require spending three years away 
from practice as a high-theoretician. That a theoretician would have the intellectual 
capacity to fully understand an experiment, given enough time, is not in doubt, but 
the practical requirements of fact-checking the scientific output of an alien 
knowledge culture conflicts with the fact that this would lead him away from the 
professional high-theoretical world. As a theoretician who has turned to more 
applied work explained: 
 
In my work I must make an effort, an enormous effort, to see if what I am 
saying has anything to do with what is out there, with an experiment. I think 
there are two kinds of theoreticians. I am of the pragmatic kind, although if 
you look at the everyday stuff I do it’s just as abstract as the people who do 
mathematical physics. [laughs] … The more I talk to them the deeper my 
knowledge about the experiment and the experimental result is. Nowadays 
I can actually see their naked experimental results without any analysis and 
know what it is they did, but that’s as far as I can go. The part that I 
participate in the most is when I tell them, ‘Look, why don’t you try this new 
thing’ and they’ll reply something like, ‘No, that’s way too hard.’ ‘Why?’ I’ll 
ask. ‘You can’t do that to the coils.’ ‘Ah, ok.’ Well, then you keep on talking. 
In general, the more you speak to them the better you’re at it. You start 
saying, ‘Ah yes, this is where the laser comes out. Of course, it has to be 
tuned into the transition I want to make, and here’s the cell and here’s the 
detector’ which are all black boxes. [emphasis added] 
 
Impeded from carrying out the fact-checking in person, theoreticians must resort 
to ‘faith’ or ‘trust’ in either the ‘obviousness’ of experimental trustworthiness, or 
trust in the job carried out by unknown colleagues who have bothered to go and 
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check the facts (e.g. the ones who work full-time at LHC). Experimental results may 
then be trusted as second or even third-hand accounts because of the certainty, 
provided the larger world of institutionalized physics. A senior theoretician 
working on QCD simulations described the work of a colleague who works within a 
multi-site collaboration: 
 
We had a meeting this weekend, and M next door has gone to Durham, and 
he’s taking some of our preliminary results up there, and he will discuss 
them with the experimenters. They will go away, and then of course they 
can e-mail back. You can then set up a dialogue where they don’t quite 
understand exactly what we did, you see. We don’t understand what they 
want to do. So you have to understand their physics. They’re sceptical 
sometimes, and we’re sometimes sceptical because you think, ‘You didn’t 
do this. You didn’t do that. How does this work? I don’t understand that.’ 
 
Theoreticians often used metaphors like ‘networks’ or (more often) ‘chains’ of 
physicists to refer to the channels for the dispersion of knowledge from experiment 
to high theory. Theoreticians are aware that experimental facts ‘travel’ from the lab 
to a theoretical setting not via single scientists, but rather via large numbers of 
individuals and knowledge webs that form intermediary links within the physics 
ecosystem, a large subset of which are not part of the high-theoreticians’ own local 
network. One theoretician, also working on high-profile high-theoretical topics, 
described physics as a continuum of experts in which high-theoretical physics 
represented one end and experiment the other, with intermediate actors 
overlapping each other’s physics between the endpoints: 
 
The whole thing is this continuum where there are hard-core theoreticians 
at one end who only work on string theory, all the way through to the guy 
with the spanner, tightening up the nuts and bolts. There are thankfully big 
overlaps between each section, but yeah, I’ve never chatted to the guy with 
the spanner. 
 
The need for overlaps and complex chains of knowledge between all elements of 
the physics ‘continuum’ was stressed by quoting a well known piece of physics 
lore, explaining how in contemporary physics it is now impossible for a single 
person to cover the entire spectrum ‘from theory to spanner’: 
 
It’s usually said that Fermi was the last guy to do [experimental work and 
theory simultaneously]. 7 I don’t know if that’s a true statement. Certainly I 
don’t know people that do it. I know of very impressive people that work on 
string theory – the geometry of extra dimensions – and at the same time do 
nuts and bolts work of top quark analysis from the data from LHC so they 
get their hands on the raw data and try to sift through and understand 
what’s top quarks and what’s not. That guy is a fairly extreme example 
because it seems that – to me at least – his two bits of work don’t overlap. 
But to go all the way through, I don’t think so. 
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Yet even data-analyst cultures – made up of physicists who statistically analyze 
‘raw’ data from experimental runs – are often also characterized by minimal 
contact with experimental cultures.  A telling example is found in the Laser 
Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO) collaboration; LIGO is 
subdivided into four major groups of researchers: the on-site experimenters, the 
data analysis team that works with the raw data, the ‘theoretical’ data analysts who 
work with the mathematics behind the actual data processing, and the ‘future 
technology’ team. 8  A senior LIGO member, leader of one of the data-analysis 
teams, described during an interview the last two groups as being the most far 
removed from experiment itself, with the raw data analysts having the closest 
contact with experimenters and working with the data-readings directly produced 
by the on-site team. Nevertheless, he also described how his data analysis group 
has little direct contact with the experimental on-site team itself, so that even 
when problems come up with the data to be analysed, he does not feel enough 
rapport to call the on-site experimental team directly: 
 
RG: How does the actual communication go about? Do you ever call up the 
experimenters at the site? I was curious as to whether you just picked up 
the phone and… 
 
Data analyst: Some people do. I don’t know the guys at the site well enough 
to just pick up the phone and say, ‘this is killing us’, but I know the person I 
would talk to who is my expert and there’s a chain… I don’t know how it 
would get to them! 
 
The ‘expert’ in this case turned out to be a graduate student who was sent to the 
experimental site for an extended period specifically to interact with the 
experimental team and be enculturated into the experimental team. The 
prolonged on-site exposure time was calculated so that the student could 
eventually have ‘a foot in each camp’ and would thus be able to ‘translate’ for the 
data analysis team what the experimental group said: 
 
You need a few people with a foot in each camp who can almost translate, 
but there are a lot of people who just don’t care to make that effort. I’ve 
done a bit, but you know one of my PhD students went to the site for four 
months and this was great for us because he came back and we’d hear 
something about what the detector did. And he’s been there and helped 
work on it and he’d say, ‘yeah, that means this’. 
 
In contrast to the trading zone or the boundary object models of two-directional 
information flow, the existence of ‘ambassadors’ and ‘translators’ of data requires 
only unidirectional flow, such that the ambassador becomes a linguistic 
‘apprentice’ to the target culture. It is therefore not necessary to set up an 
intermediary linguistic or conceptual common zone of interaction, so long as there 
is at least one trusted individual who can be a direct linguistic link to the 
experimental production site (in none of the above cases was it necessary for the 
on-site link to be able to be proficient in the experimental tasks).9 Once these 
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‘ambassadors’ comes to grips with the language of the on-site data producers, the 
information is then amenable to transmission to the rest of the team in their own, 
translated, practice language. The data analyst team leader thus remarked: 
 
We have our weekly meeting about what we analysed the last week by 
telecom. We’d get our story together and try to poke in on this data. 
Sometimes we will come to them. If my student was at the site he’d just 
come and pass it on.  […] To do something like that you need a point-to-
point contact between the two groups, and that can be someone who’s 
visiting somewhere, or it could just be a relationship that’s grown up. 
 
Other conceptual and technical barriers to communication 
 
The barriers between high-theory and experiment aren’t only due to differences in 
technical or linguistic aspects but can reach to even the more fundamental levels 
of how a problem is conceptualized. Although a full analysis of this is beyond the 
scope of this paper, a few observations are in order. One of the interviewees, who 
described himself as being halfway between the world of high-theory and applied 
mathematics, interestingly explained how experimenters also tend to find what is 
relevant about a physical system very different to what a high-theoretician would 
consider important: 
 
RG: Do you find it easy to communicate with experimental physicists? 
Theoretician: No, no I don’t. The reason is that they use different notations 
and different wave languages. It’s irritating because sometimes you know 
from theory that a certain combination of variables is a parameter, one 
parameter, which is very useful. They use all the different constituent 
parameters. They keep eleven, or three of them, together and they often 
miss the point. […] 
 
He then added, 
 
They don’t think geometrically. Interesting, you think they might but they 
don’t. Often it’s very helpful to do so. They tend to think arithmetically, 
which is irritating. […] There’s a tendency in that direction which is very 
frustrating if you want to follow an argument. 
 
Another young theoretician who works closely with experimenters within a 
quantum optics lab setting pointed out how the differences in time and material 
constraints also require one to adapt to different work cultures: 
 
On one hand there’s teamwork, and having to rely on other people. On the 
other hand, adapting yourself … it can happen when you’re working in [a] 
theoretical problem that you have a clear idea of where you want to go, 
that you begin down a road and it wasn’t the correct one and you have to 
take another one. You also need a plan B there. As far as methodology goes 
you probably find fewer surprises. … In general, to understand things 
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[theoreticians] try to simplify things as much as possible. We try to cleanse 
the problem of all the collateral situations, and leave it as clean as possible. 
In experiment sometimes it is impossible to perform such isolation.  
 
Pickering (1999) has discussed how, apart from disparities in techniques and 
jargon, dissimilar ontologies also populate subcultures’ perspectives on a physical 
system. Galison has described how in early QCD physics dissimilar ontological 
perspectives differentiated the theoretical from the experimental communities; 
according to Galison (1997: 652), the language of experimenters was that of 
‘bubble chamber physics: lambdas, pions, kaons, protons, and sigmas embedded 
in the dynamics that describe their production and transformation’ while the 
language of ‘basic theory’ (high-theory) was that of ‘quarks, gluons and their 
interactions’. 
 
Varieties of trust  
 
As shown in the previous sections, the gaps in conceptual, methodological, 
technical, interpretative and linguistic elements ‘force’ theoreticians to trust or 
have faith in personally unverified experimental knowledge, but that this trust is 
bolstered by colleagues who form indirect links to experimental cultures. Trust can 
therefore take on a variety of forms: the direct appreciation of a colleague’s skills or 
a well-earned reputation for good work; a theoretician-ambassador’s passive 
acceptance of an experimental form of life which is initially like an alien culture; or, 
in more extreme cases where the expertise links become obscured by social 
distance, simply ‘blind faith’ in a standard experimental result. 
Although in everyday usage these different types of trust are seldom 
differentiated, once examined in detail one can see very different mechanisms at 
work. Yet this differentiation is not often made in the scholarly literature, either, or 
is only mentioned in passing. In their general review of the trust literature, Mayer et 
al. (1995) found that it suffers from ‘problems  with  the  definition  of  trust  itself;  
lack  of  clarity  in  the relationship  between  risk  and  trust;  confusion  between  
trust  and  its  antecedents  and  outcomes;  lack  of  specificity  of  trust  referents  
leading  to confusion  in levels  of analysis;  and  a failure  to consider  both  the  
trusting party  and  the  party  to be  trusted In this same spirit.’ Hardin (2002: 55-
56) also has a poignant analysis on the uses and abuses of ‘trust’ as an explanatory 
catchphrase, particularly in the social sciences, concluding that the incomplete 
analyses of trust that are common in the literature ‘are often, though not always, 
conceptually confused’ and that ‘casual accounts might not even distinguish trust 
in another person, trust in a fact of nature, and trust in an institution.’ 
I similarly propose a better understanding of communication and 
knowledge transfer in science, by looking specifically at the types of ‘trust’ that 
actually come into play in specific communication settings in order to understand 
how relationships between the groups of individuals in question shape their 
knowledge practices. My analysis is therefore also an attempt to overcome 
conceptual confusions on the different vernacular usages of ‘trust’ in STS, the 
intermixing of concepts as loose and diverse as trust, trustworthiness, confidence, 
credibility, risk, certainty, etc. 
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The paper is not meant as a review of trust in STS as a whole, but rather a 
starting point for refocusing future discussions on trust in relation to knowledge 
transfer. I will specifically concentrate the rest of my discussion on how the 
empirical evidence collected above points to a relationship between social 
distance and different trust-based mechanisms. 
 
Trust and social distance 
 
Issues on trust have a long pedigree within STS. As Shapin (1995) notes, issues of 
how validity, credibility, trustworthiness and trust arise in scientists and their 
accounts are tied to the very roots of STS, and the differentiation between validity 
and credibility is the birthmark of the field as an autonomous discipline.  Shapin 
also noted the need to elucidate not only ‘classes of credibility predicaments’, but 
also ‘the tactics of credibility-management that seem pervasively pertinent to 
those classes’ (p. 258). This is the task to be carried out here in relation to the 
following predicament: at ever increasing social distances from experiment, how is 
it that theoretical physicists can claim their practice to be ‘empirically sound’? The 
answer, following Shapin, will lie in examining the types of ‘trust’-based tactics on 
which I have shown theoreticians to rely.  
The most immediate ‘trust’ that has been illustrated here, trust in a familiar 
and reputable scientific colleague, is known as either ‘inter-personal trust’ or 
‘foundational trust’ in the sociological literature. Inter-personal trust will not be 
discussed in detail here, having been analysed in depth in many other STS contexts 
(Collins, 2001; Hedgecoe, 2012; Lewis and Atkinson, 2011; MacKenzie, 1990, 2001; 
Shapin, 1994; Stephens et al., 2011) and in the general sociology literature (Hardin, 
2002, 2006; Mayer et al., 1995; Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 2002,) in how it relates to 
wider ‘systemic trust’ (e.g. Giddens, 1990, 1991; Luhmann, 1979; McDonell, 1997; 
Sztompka, 1999). Interpersonal and foundational trust, given that it is characterized 
by close inter-subjective bonds, constant contact between social actors and direct 
interactions, is the domain of least social distance; individuals that partake in 
developing this kind of trust maintain a good degree of interactions in common 
social settings. 
As the distance between a high-theoretician and an experimental culture 
increases, another form of trust arises, a ‘trust-by-proxy’ that someone else has 
carried out the verification of knowledge or understood how an experimental 
result can be used in theorizing.  In the ‘ambassadorial’ LIGO account, the proxy is 
himself linked to the group and the experimental culture directly by interpersonal 
trust bonds: the graduate student’s account and interactional skills have to be 
taken at face value by the theoretical research group, just as the graduate student 
must take at face value the experimental culture. But in other cases, such as the 
QCD collaboration, the trust bonds may be partially established by the 
institutionally sanctioned position of a person, and not necessarily on personal 
acquaintance.10 Likewise, the young theoretician who sees the intermediary links in 
the spanner-to-theory chain disappear nevertheless ‘trusts’ that ‘someone’ has 
done the verification of experimental claims directly since he ‘knows’ that he could 
do it himself. 
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This transition from ‘visible’ to ‘partially visible’ to ‘invisible’ proxies is quick 
as the social distance is increased. For example, in explaining the dynamics behind 
disseminating his own work in quark computer simulations, the senior QCD 
theoretician explained: 
 
You publish the paper. The paper goes out. The title obviously attracts other 
people. They might be the experimenters directly who have their own pet 
theorists, but it might be other people who have a parameterization for the 
decay rate which takes into account things we can’t calculate but in the 
middle sits this number we can calculate. I mean, I can’t tell you their names. I 
can think of people that might do that. It’s important to just seed the world 
with this knowledge in chunks, and it gets picked out.11 [emphasis added] 
 
The collaborations he refers to here were set up directly by some of his colleagues 
as in the LIGO ambassador’s case, but despite experimenters’ work being 
fundamental to the project as a whole he himself had little personal contact with 
the experimenters. Morgan (2001) and Haycock (2011) have referred to actors who 
accompany ‘facts’ in their journey from their place of origin to the place where they 
will be used once these are prepared for ‘travel’ as chaperones. High-theoreticians 
have nearby colleagues who begin the ‘chain of chaperones’ that connect high-
theory with experiment, but that become rapidly obscure as social distance 
increases. Despite no interpersonal trust coming into play, the distant chaperones 
that lie beyond the theoretician’s local social event horizon must be hypothesised 
to be just as trustworthy as the closer ones if the knowledge they produce is to be 
taken as a trustworthy ‘fact’ and if the knowledge chain is to remain unbroken. 
There is, however, a source of confidence in this trust: acquaintance with the 
institutional world of physics and the structure of the profession as a whole. This 
socialization is what justifiably separates it from absolute ‘blind faith’. 
 Intrinsically tied to but different to this type of direct socialization is what 
Collins and Evans (2007) have referred to as ‘meta-expertises’: skills, technical 
knowledge and particularly social knowledge that allows individuals to make sense 
of other cultures through acquaintance with one’s own, so that  ‘those with little 
scientific knowledge can sometimes make what amounts to a technical judgment 
on the basis of their social understanding’ (p. 45). There is a limit, however, to the 
effectiveness of meta-expertises that is tied to the proximity of these cultures. It 
would likely be possible for, say, a chemist or a mathematician to make sense of the 
social world of physics and to make sense of its most standardized technical parts. 
In fact, academics, university managers and research project directors often rely on 
similar ‘referred social knowledge’ to coordinate activities with individuals from 
dissimilar knowledge cultures based on knowledge of their own traditions, or of 
society at large (see for example Collins and Sanders 2007). Nevertheless, the 
power of meta-expertises decreases as the knowledge cultures become dissimilar, 
that is, increase in social distance. An STS scholar could likely make sense of a ‘hard’ 
scientific culture quite well even while being a social scientist, but we also know 
that many social scientists unacquainted with the natural sciences fail to do so – 
and vice versa with natural scientists making sense of the social sciences. Giddens 
(1991) has discussed such cases of ‘referred trust’ noting that one can rely on the 
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actions of sanctioned professionals (e.g. masons and architects) not because of a 
personal acquaintance with particular persons one interacts with sporadically, or 
with their social milieus, but because one is confident that their social worlds are 
close enough to our own that we can understand the trustworthiness of the 
institutions that sanction their roles (e.g. professional affiliations and 
accreditations). 
Finally, we must consider the delegation of epistemic authority and 
depersonalization that distancing implies. The further a chaperone is from a high-
theoretician, the less likely it is that the high-theoretician will have the necessary 
credentials to challenge the chaperone’s authority, particularly between the 
furthest ends of the theory-to-spanner spectrum.12 Given enough social distance, 
the chaperones themselves can become completely obscure to the endpoints of 
the chain. The change from partial to full obscurity implies a final change in the 
social mechanisms that give rise to ‘trust’: a transition into the suspension of doubt, 
which is as close as one can come in science to actual ‘blind faith’.13 In both social 
and epistemic terms the suspension of doubt lies within the domain of largest 
social distance as all social interactions, direct or by proxy, disappear between the 
endpoints of emitter and receiver of knowledge. The suspension of doubt is the 
sociological mechanism that allows knowledge to flow across the largest social 
distances. This kind of knowledge transmission is particularly important in classic 
STS work such as Latour’s (1986, 1987) and Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) 
ethnographic studies of ‘black boxed’ laboratories: empirical knowledge factories 
whose end product s are ‘inscriptions’. As Robson (1992) points out when 
reconstructing the concept, ‘the utilization of inscriptions […] assists in enabling 
action at a distance.’ 
 
A bundle of trust: Virtual empiricism 
 
I have argued that different degrees of social distance lead to different kinds of 
‘trust’ and to different types of trust that fundamentally underlie communication in 
physics. Though some authors choose to identify ‘trust’ solely with interpersonal 
dimensions (e.g. Hardin, 2002; Shrum et al., 2001), many others do not make the 
distinction. The multiple vernacular uses of trust to some degree justify this 
practice, and there is no reason why we should deny this ‘family resemblance’ 
usage. Nevertheless, as has been argued, it is undeniable that what counts as ‘trust’ 
comes in distinct varieties. The three types of trust discussed above and their 
correlation to social distance are summarized in the following table: 
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Social distance Dominant type of 
trust 
Characteristic type of knowledge 
exchanged 
Minimal  Foundational/ 
Interpersonal trust 
Collective, relational and somatic 
tacit/high level explicit technical 
skills 
Medium Trust by 
proxy/Institutional 
trust 
Relational tacit knowledge/explicit 
technical references /meta-
expertises and referred social 
judgement 
Maximal Suspension of doubt Only explicit, inscription-type 
 
Table 2: Relation between trust, social distance and type of knowledge that can be exchanged. The 
labels marking the amount of social distance are heuristic names. The classification of tacit knowledge 
is taken from Collins (2010) and can be linked to work by Collins & Evans’ (2007) in their ‘Periodic Table 
of Expertise’: at minimal distance, one can become fully socialized into a linguistic expert culture 
(‘interactional expertise’) while at medium distances any type of ‘ubiquitous tacit knowledge’ can be 
gained – possibly along with bits and pieces of the collective tacit knowledge of a knowledge culture. At 
maximal distances only inscriptions (‘beer-mat knowledge’ for Collins and Evans) can be acquired.  
The important point here is that there is a qualitative jump between the observed 
mechanisms at work between the trust that supports knowledge flow as social 
distance increases. Additionally, the increase in social distance also imply 
limitations on the type of knowledge that can be meaningfully exchanged (Collins 
and Evans, 2007; Collins, 2010). 
I will call the rhetorical intermixing of this set of trust-based strategies to 
deal with communication across social gaps virtual empiricism. ‘Virtual empiricism’ 
is ab initio an actor’s category necessary for the analyst to make sense of how 
physics ‘really is’ an empirical science in spite of the deep, cultural fragmentation 
between theory and experiment. Nevertheless, physics’ virtual empiricism is not 
empty rhetoric – it is built up from tacit knowledge exchanges, socially embedded 
practices and acquaintance with the institutions of science, which allow 
theoreticians to justifiably (in a sociological sense) claim their work to be 
‘empirically sound’. 
Virtual empiricism resonates, but also has significant differences, with 
Shapin and Schaffer’s (1985) similarly termed concept of virtual witnessing. Virtual 
witnessing, the establishment of trust in experimental procedures outside the 
circle of those directly involved in material witnessing, is illustrated by Shapin and 
Schaffer (1985: 65) in Robert Boyle’s usage of literary and rhetorical devices to 
multiply the number of ‘witnesses’ of particular experiments. In their account, 
Boyle tried to convince non-witnesses that his experiments were the trustworthy 
and accurate descriptions of careful experimental work by ‘gentlemen scientists’, 
by using naturalistic graphic portrayals and prolix descriptions of experiments. 14 
Later on, this was translated into the institutional framework of the Royal Society. 
The salient difference between virtual empiricism and virtual witnessing is 
methodological – virtual witnessing focuses on historical processes of 
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institutionalization of scientific knowledge, while virtual empiricism takes trust as 
an established pre-requisite for the communication of knowledge once it has been 
standardized. In this respect, virtual empiricism notes that institutionalization, 
while it may be seen as the end result of knowledge, cannot be sustained solely 
through institutionalization. The work of ambassadors, proxies and chaperones, 
the constant and sustained flow of knowledge, is just as important – no more, no 
less – as that of institutions in everyday science. 
 
Reassessing trust in STS using virtual empiricism: Two cases 
 
The theoretical complexity added by virtual empiricism relative to the 
straightforward ‘trust’-based accounts criticised by Mayer and Hardin can only be 
justified if it adds further explanatory power. In this last section I will briefly 
reassess two important STS studies that problematize issues of trust, and note how 
reassessing their findings using virtual empiricism can add a richer explanation of 
them. 
As a first example, MacKenzie (1990, 2001) has shown that amongst 
technology users and producer one can see the existence of a ‘certainty trough’, a 
phenomenon in which different levels of certainty or trust arise depending on 
users’ social distance to the site of production. Apparently contradicting the thesis 
that ‘trust’ is fundamental to technology and knowledge transfer, MacKenzie finds 
that uncertainty/trust levels fluctuate in a typical manner – rising/dipping at the 
extremes of the distance scale, but being low/high in the middle areas. As is done 
here, MacKenzie also identifies three major social distance scales of knowledge 
exchange: 
1) Individuals close to the locus of technology production have higher levels 
of uncertainty regarding the technology because they know the limitations 
that only insiders (those socialized into the technology production culture) 
can grasp in detail; this implies minimal levels of ‘trust’. 
2) Users institutionally committed to a technology display the largest amount 
of certainty and trust in the technology. 
3) Non-users (users of a competing technology, for example) display the 
largest amounts of uncertainty, and least amounts of trust. 
The apparent paradox that creators much better informed about a technology 
display significantly less trust that users who are further away is dissolved if, rather 
than looking at how an unspecified, monolithic type of ‘trust’ changes across social 
distance, one focuses on the type of trust that is predominant in each situation; the 
trough then would seem either to disappear or smooth out since: 
1) Experts within or socialized into the locus of production must display high 
levels of foundational and interpersonal trust if they are to be part of a 
community at all, but then may be highly sceptical of accounts that try to 
institutionally legitimize a technology or that try to hide away the intrinsic 
uncertainties of technology (Collins, 1985). At this distance, minimal distance 
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trust strategies are necessarily high, even though institutional or proxy-based 
trust is minimal. 
2) As distance from the locus of production increases, MacKenzie finds that 
institutionalization standardizes the usage of technology alongside an 
increase in the delegation of epistemic authority to ‘experts’ in order to 
minimize uncertainty, a phenomenon well known to the STS literature (Star, 
1985; Lahsen, 2005). Thus in mid-range settings institutional trust is high, 
even if there is no deep acquaintance through socialization of the core culture 
of a field of expertise. 
3) At the extreme ends, non-users may of course have no acquaintance or 
trust in any form, or they may be absolutely passive recipients or users of 
the technology or knowledge. In the latter case, we are still within the realm 
of virtual empiricism, specifically where the suspension of doubt operates. 
Although interpersonal and even institutional trust is absent, ‘trust’ in abstract 
systems, meta-expertises and referred social knowledge, or suspension of doubt 
allows passive users to operate with the given technology, even if they hold 
nothing beyond operational knowledge of the technology. 
We should keep in mind that social distancing is a twofold process that at the far 
extreme involves the suspension of doubt as well as the relegation of epistemic 
authority to ‘experts’ and their ‘standardized’ opinion. The case may then arise in 
which individuals don’t use a piece of technology at all, or in which they reject 
knowledge claims not because of acquaintance with them, but because of 
complete separation from the social world of their source. In that case, 
experts/knowledge producers and the group of ‘non-users’ will live in completely 
dissimilar or antagonistic social worlds, even though the experts may still be 
recognised as such. In the case of ‘crank science’, for example, many theoretical 
physicists have recorded how the former often attack the experts themselves as 
‘defenders of the orthodoxy’. The scenario then lies outside the realm of virtual 
empiricism and within the realm of complete mistrust, for, as Luhman (1979) 
argues, some type of familiarity between social actors is necessary if one is to talk 
about the possibility of any sort of trust relationship existing between them. 
Beyond virtual empiricism’s border lies, for example, the abyss between ‘experts’ 
and ‘laypeople’ responsible for the lack of trust which has been identified one of 
the fundamental problems of contemporary STS scholarship (Collins and Evans, 
2007; Irwin, 2006).  
A final application of virtual empiricism can be made by examining the work 
on Big Science collaborations by Shrum et al. (2001, 2007). The study they develop 
strongly questions the importance of ‘trust’ in STS analyses, finding ‘trust’ irrelevant 
to perceived success in strongly collaborative scientific contexts. Their empirical 
analysis of a number of large scale collaborations leads to the claim that that ‘the 
role of trust in Big Science has been greatly exaggerated’, so that in collaborative 
contexts trust ‘is not of any fundamental significance’ (Shrum et al., 2001: 682). This 
contrasts with typical STS outlooks such as Knorr-Cetina’s (1999), which claim trust 
as fundamental to collaboration. 
Working from an informed outlook on trust, Shrum et al. identify two forms 
of it: ‘encapsulated interest’ trust, that is, trust relationships based on mutual, 
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shared interests; and ‘confidence’, or ‘an orientation towards institutions  such  as 
government or the media’ (Shrum et al. 2001: 687). In fact, upon closer scrutiny, 
what Shrum et al. argue is that encapsulated interest trust (of the minimal social 
distance type) is irrelevant, but that institutional trust is necessary for conflict to be 
minimized. But Shrum et al. (p. 686) earlier point out that what they call 
‘foundational trust’ ‘is necessary for collaboration in general – within science and 
without’ yet that in being ubiquitous to all social interactions ‘it warrants no special 
attention.’ Strangely enough, given that it is earlier a ‘taken for granted’ element of 
social interaction, Shrum et al.’s (2007: 151-194) empirical analysis actually probes, 
mainly, the relevance of interpersonal trust, while later slipping into a non-specific 
usage of ‘trust’ that forgets the initial differentiation made between the 
foundational trust, institutional trust and confidence. This leads them to the 
seemingly anti-climactic conclusion (when compared to their strongly dismissive 
statement about ‘trust’) that their empirical evidence ‘pertains to variations in trust’ 
(Shrum et al., 2007: 215), and that ‘trust both is and is not important’ (Shrum et al., 
2001: 718). 
Despite the confusion in terminology, the conclusion that minimal-distance 
trust is irrelevant in collaborative contexts is certainly a striking one, and Shrum et 
al.’s results are interesting to contrast with the LIGO account presented here. LIGO 
has also faced problems on how to deal institutionally with the distances between 
its various constituent cultures and has worked to create platforms of cooperation. 
Although, like Shrum et al., I’ve argued that institutional trust is predominant at 
certain distances, LIGO collaborators strongly pointed out that interpersonal trust 
is necessary to bolster overall successes. A top level LIGO manager commented, for 
example, on how an ongoing effort to create a new comprehensive collaboration 
programme involved considerable help from the data-analyst team leader that 
during the interviews had placed a lot of emphasis on the necessity of having 
point-to-point interpersonal contact: 
 
Even within the theoretical area there might be difficulties amongst 
different levels to talk to, for example, numerical relativists about numerical 
simulations of black holes. That’s one area where we had a lot of difficulty 
understanding their language and effort was put in. [F – the same data-
analyst who described the ambassador student] was one of the leaders in 
starting a group called NINJA which helped create a platform in exchanging 
ideas. Not just ideas! Also to set up a language, a common language 
between these two. It requires a lot of effort. 
 
The NINJA group has decided to focus on very specific topics that are of common 
interest to all participating groups. 15  Unsurprisingly, these topics have the 
characteristics of boundary objects with which all the collaboration’s members can 
interact with directly (‘the merger phase of binary black hole (BBH) coalescence’). 
According to the top-level manager’s description, NINJA is an attempt to create ‘a 
common language’ for collaboration – that is, the platform has all the 
characteristics of an emerging, coordinated trading zone. LIGO is similar to the 
institutional settings analysed by Shrum et al’s in which trust ‘is and is not 
important’. It is important for the data-analyst to understand the glitches of 
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experiment through the student socialised into the experimental site culture, and 
in turn these sparse but vital interpersonal links eases the way and allow other 
communication infrastructures to operate efficiently. Likewise the creation of 
boundary objects and trading zones is necessary within the larger collaborative 
structure, but these also rely on the interactional bridges that socialisation 
practices create. 
Rather than arguing that some sort of generic ‘trust’ or any specific form of 
it is the critical component of scientific communication, virtual empiricism starts 
out from the observed relevance of all forms of trust in scientific communication in 
all real settings and for all theoretical models of interaction (e.g. enculturation, 
boundary objects and trading zones). However, it then does specify the expected 
trust-channel that ought to dominate depending on the social distance between 
interacting cultures, an issue that should be empirically accessible once a scale of 
social distance is defined. Then at least one ‘trust’ element of virtual empiricism will 
be present for communication to occur, and it will mould the type interaction that 
is established between interacting cultures. 
Finally, returning to the problem of disunity, I have illustrated that while 
common-ground strategies may dominate scientific communication in particular 
settings, enculturation practices have a similarly important place in sustaining 
communication at closer social distances. Enculturation relies on inter-personal 
trust, while common ground strategies depend on trust at intermediate and large 
distances – the virtual empiricist expanded version of trust bridges social distance 
gaps which knowledge must flow across whichever ones of these mechanisms are 
finally put into place. 
Many issues on trust remain to be explored. The reverse communication 
flow of that analysed here – the communication of theoretical knowledge to 
experiment – has not been dealt with and certainly can make for an interesting 
follow up to this study. It is expected that the flow of theoretical knowledge to 
other subcultures would be of a similar nature and initial studies into the 
connection between high-theory and other subcultures – e.g. the relationship 
between physical theory and pure and applied mathematics – supports this thesis 
(Reyes-Galindo, 2011). 
One would also expect, being based on general sociological arguments, 
that the approach should be relevant not just to physics but to scientific 
communication in general, which would require further empirical investigation. 
Additionally, issues on the types of trust that may appear in science or technology 
are by no means exhausted by my analysis. There is ample room for discussions of 
trust in STS beyond the virtual empiricism domain: discussion of trust not only 
between individuals or even groups, but also extending ‘trust’ to such diverse areas 
as computerized systems (MacKenzie 2001), public institutionalized standards 
(Porter 1995) and even aesthetic practices in science (Carusi 2008). 
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1 See Collins (1985), Galison (1997), Knorr-Cetina (1999) and Feyerabend (1975) for 
the locality of practice.  See Dupré (1995) and the works in Galison and Stump 
(1996) for specific discussions on the relationship between the locality of practice, 
language and metaphysics and the ‘disunity thesis’.   
2 Merz and Knorr-Cetina (1997) use a typology of theoretical physics micro-cultures 
that divide its practice into ‘mathematical’, ‘high-theoretical’ and 
‘phenomenological’. Galison (1997) also spells out the difference between a 
‘theoretical’ and a ‘phenomenological’ culture in non-experimental physics. Other 
classifications are of course possible; see Reyes-Galindo (2011) where a 
classification of theoretical physics into a more diverse range of ‘epistemic cultures’ 
is carried out in the spirit of Knorr-Cetina’s work on the diversity of experimental 
‘styles’. For brevity’s sake, I have ignored this more accurate classification, as well as 
Merz and Knorr-Cetina’s well known theses on the diversity of micro-cultures 
existing within experiment as a whole, treating ‘experiment’ as a monumental 
whole. 
 
3 In general, biological ‘theory’ tends to be connected with experiment. Biologists 
seem comfortable with the supposition that even ‘theoreticians’ ought to have 
ample lab experience, an attitude rarely if ever seen in theoretical physics circles. 
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Immunologist Medawar (1969: 57) wrote that ‘most scientists cannot be classified 
as either experimentalists or theorists, because most of us are both’, a statement 
that while plausible in biology is definitely not the case in physics. However, 
Shrager (2010) points out that in molecular biology there has been a shift towards 
a situation similar to physics, where data producers and data users are separated 
from each other, with computer scientists and statisticians acting as middle-men. 
One of the theoreticians interviewed for this project – a former theoretical biologist 
who had worked and co-authored papers with one of the most eminent molecular 
biologists of the twentieth century – commented: 
I arrived at theoretical biology just when the great era of theoretical biology 
had ended… the structure of DNA, how proteins are structured … the kind 
of informational picture of biology had just been completed. There 
followed an epoch where everyone was so impressed by the success of 
theoreticians in biology that they backed it long after it had produced 
anything worthwhile. I was brought into the field with a background in 
maths because they thought I’d have the skills to do some theoretical 
biology. I did experimental work, which quite rightfully you had to do too, 
but I was meant to be a sort of semi-theoretical biologist. And I consider it 
to be a bogus profession; nothing ever came out of it. When I say it’s a 
bogus subject in biology I mean there is no theory [by itself]. I sort of left 
molecular biology, fair enough, when it was becoming sensible to be a 
theoretician of a different kind, mainly the kind who does computer science 
and tries to organize data. 
4 As Pickering (1999: 4) summarizes in relation to physicists’ popular writing, they 
describe their field as one where ‘experiment is seen as the supreme arbiter of 
theory’. But Pickering (1981, 1984) has also shown how, in contradiction to this 
public façade, ‘no scientific claim at either the instrumental or phenomenal level is 
absolutely compelling’. See also Duhem (1996). 
 
5See Collins (1984, 1985). Discussing the importance of tacit knowledge in particle 
detector technology transfer, Galison (1997: 54) points out that in the 
dissemination of detector technology ‘[t]here is no doubt that there were 
instruments and effects the replication of which required no movement of 
personnel and objects.’ Nevertheless, these were exactly the instances in which 
‘scientist-to-scientist “craft exchanges” [did] not figure at all’.  
6 There is, however, an important 20th century theoretical tradition that tends to 
downplays the role of experiment, which I refer to as the ‘first principles’ approach 
to physical theory. This tradition played a significant role in the discourse 
surrounding the search for Grand Unified Theory of physics late in the century, 
particularly in popular expositions of theoretical physics. In physics lore, Einstein is 
often portrayed as the father of the unification ideal, and his search for ‘symmetry’ 
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and ‘beauty’ fills first-principle theory mythology. Zee (1986), for example, writes, 
‘my colleagues and I in fundamental physics are the descendants of Albert Einstein; 
we like to think that we too search for beauty. Some physics equations are so ugly 
that we cannot bear to look at them, let alone write them down’, adding that ‘when 
presented with two alternative equations purporting to describe Nature, we always 
choose the one that appeals to our aesthetic sense. [...] Such is the rallying cry of 
fundamental physics.’ Zee juxtaposes the attitude of ‘fundamental physics’ with 
those of  
phenomenological theories, constructed simply to ‘explain’ a given 
phenomenon. Theorists craft such theories to fit the data, and get out as 
much as they put in. They lead their phenomenological theories, rather 
than the other way around. Such theories may be of great practical 
importance, but typically they tell us little, if anything, about other 
phenomena, and I find them to be of no fundamental interest. 
See Galison (1997: 643) for a discussion of this same situation within quantum 
chromodynamics. 
7 Fermi is often portrayed as the last of physics’ ‘Renaissance men’, a polymath who 
could build a crucial experiment just as well as he could construct the theory to 
explain it; see Dyson (2004) and Galison (1997: 798). 
8 LIGO is a collaboration of over 800 scientists housed at numerous institutions 
around the world, with one central aim: to find theoretically predicted but as yet 
undetected gravitational waves. It is currently the largest project ever funded by 
the National Science Foundation. For a full history of LIGO see Collins (2004, 
2011b). 
9Collins (2011a: 287) has described ambassador-like scientists in LIGO as possessing 
‘specialist interactional expertise’, to stress that they have only linguistic and no 
practical immersion in the domain that they translate from, illustrating how the 
existence of these ‘interactional ambassadors’ or ‘special interactional experts’ in 
the gravitational wave community. Collins and Ribeiro (2007) have used the 
‘interactional expertise model’ to analyse similar cases that involve the training of 
‘linguistic ambassadors’ and ‘cultural translators’ to mediate inter-group 
communications in collaborative techno-scientific contexts. 
10 See Giddens (1990, 1991), Luhmann (1979) and McDonell (1997) for theoretical 
analyses of institutional trust and how it is arises from interpersonal situations. See 
Shapin (1994) for a historical analysis of the emergence of inter-personal and its 
transition to institutional trust in early physical science (the depersonalisation of 
trust)  as well and Hedgecoe’s (2012) empirical analysis of UK Research Ethics 
Committees surrounding the intermixing of the interpersonal and institutional 
forms of trust in practical contexts. 
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11As it turns out, when carrying out a citation analysis of this theoretician’s 
publications after the interview, the author found that – unknown to either the 
interviewer or the interviewee – one of the articles the interviewer had co-authored 
in his period as a physics researcher had once been cited by the interviewee. 
12 In one of the few in depth case studies on theoretical physics work, Kennefick 
(2000, 2007) analysed a debate within a general relativity theoretical community in 
which computer simulationists lying outside the relativist ‘core set’ presented 
results that were at odds with the theoretical standard views. Kennefick has argued 
that the simulationists faced several disadvantages in trying to overcome the 
relativists’ rejection of their result, including the lack of ‘social capital’ at their 
disposal and their ability to understand the ‘evidential context’ of their results as 
outsiders. Thus, social distance was associated with both their ability to 
meaningfully intervene in the controversy as well as in finding a position of 
epistemic legitimacy within the community where they sought for the results to be 
relevant. See also Pinch (1986). 
13 This take on the ‘suspension of doubt’ follows Schütz’s (1932: 98) description of 
the ‘natural attitude’. See McDonell (1997), Sztompka (1999: 13) and Bourdieu 
(1975: 23) for sociological analyses of the suspension of doubt. 
14 In relation to experimental knowledge, Gooding (1986: 219) has used cases in the 
history of physics to explain how once a novel phenomenon has reached a point of 
stabilization, experimenters construct rationalized reconstructions of the 
experimental phenomenon in order to ‘articulate a concept implicit in exploratory 
practices […] or enable a phenomenon to be realised and made accessible to many 
observers’. Gooding notes that rational reconstructions of experiments such as 
Faraday’s or Davy’s are the end results of processes of –reification of meaning, as 
they go through stages of ‘construal’, interpretation’, ‘definitive interpretation’ and 
‘exemplars’, so that as the ‘phenomenon’ stabilizes its recipients become 
increasingly passive to the received knowledge. 
15 The NINJA (Numerical INJection Analysis) project is described in the group’s wiki 
as follows: 
The goal of the NINJA project is to bring the numerical relativity and data 
analysis communities together to pursue projects of common interest in the 
areas of gravitational-wave detection, astrophysics and astronomy. 
